Embedded patterns of international alliance formation. by Osborn, Richard N. et al.
Embedded Pattems of International
Alliance Formation
Richard N. Osborn, John Hagedoorn, Johannes G. Denekamp,







































Using a combination of institutional, systems contingency ;md ecological theory,
this paper argues and etnpirically demonsdates thai key founding characteristics of
international alliances arc etnbedded (interactiveiy related) in one another.
Specifically, the technical area of the alliance activity, the intended direction of
product/knowledge liows atnong sponsors, and the administrative form o\' the
alliances are shown to be interactively related. Further, the concept of entbedded-
ness was cotnbined with Transaction Cost Economics (TCE} and technological
views lo show two founding pattems. One pattern called Hv'bridization was con-
sistent with technological explanations while the second called Dominance was
suggested by TCE approaches. The new interactive relationships were identified in
two large samples involving US, Japanese and European lirms during a period from
1970 to 1989,
Descriptors: strategic alliances, institutional theory
Introduction
International alliances are an increasingly numerous, diverse, and impor-
tant social and economic mechanism for international :nterfinn adaptation
and cooperation (see reviews by Grandori and Soda 1995 and Hagedoorn
1993a), Prior work provides an array of partially contradictory recommen-
dations on how managers should fomi international a iiances (cf. discus-
sions by Culpan 1993: Mowery 1988; Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997: Ring
and Van de Vcn 1992 and Williamson 1991, 1996). One comtnon theme
across many studies of international alliances is that of embeddedness —
the fit among environmental and organizational characi eristics (see Auster
1992; Dunning 1993; Williamson 1991), Our review suggested that Ihere
was liltie agreement about whether international alliances were or should
be embedded in their sponsors (e.g. Kogut 1988). their industries (e.g.
Auster 1992), their nations (e.g. Whitley 1994) or some international sociai
and economic structure (e.g. Osborn and Baughn 1993). There is also con-
siderable confusion regarding how to operationali/c embeddedness when
international alliances typically involve at least two sccial, econotnic and
corporate systems (cT, Granovetter 1986).
The purjiosc of this manuscript is to introduce a more iniegrative perspective618 Richard N, Osborn et al
of inlernutitinal alliance formalion. It melds key elements from institutional
theory, systems contingency theory, transaction cost economics and tech-
nological j>erspectivcs to examine ihc issue i>r einheddedness. Ati institu-
lioiuii view is Introduced to suggest that alliance fonnation characteristics
tiuiy CDiilnnn to a type of industry embeddedness based on collective icarn-
Ing and inlbrnicd itnitation. This notion of embeddedness leads to specilic
empirical expectalions which incor|X)nttc the itUeractive logic of systems
contitigcticy theory. This ititcgration yields testable hypoEhcscs conccriiitig
very specilic lypcs {)f alliances (two institutionalized subpopulations of
aiiiances). These hypotheses are testetl using two c|uito diriercnt large-scale
samples. Otic sample tbcuscs i*ii U.S,/.Japanese alliance foiniations. whiie
the other incorporates formations beiween Western Europe, Japan and the
United States,
Literature Review
What is An International Corporate Alliance?
Part of the confusion in the literature stems from the wide variety of names
and meanings attached \o international cooperations among coi-poraiions
(cf. Burgers et al. 1993: Culpan 1993; Hagedoorn 1993a-" Kogul 1988:
Parkhe 1993 and Williamson 1991), Mere, an international corporate
alliance may be defined as a publicly recogni/ed exchatige atid/or Joint
value creation arrangement beiween two or more tinns (sponsors) that are
headquartered in separate nations where (a) the area for exchange and/or
johil value creation is specified and (bl the arrangement is e,\pected to cover
several distinct transaetion periods.
While this appears to be a fairly standard defitiition (e.g. Contractor anil
Lorangf 1988) it differs from nian\' others in three important ways. One,
it explicitly separates publicly announced long-tenii associations from sim-
ple spot contracts and short-term projects (cf. Park and Llngsoti 1997). Two.
it includes provisions for both exchange and poiential joint value ereatioti
{following Toyne's 1989 suggcsiion to emphasize the exchange us the unii
of analysis rather than a sponsor). Three, the specific expectations of one
sponsor are not explicitly incorporated into the definition. We presume that
the sponsors niay or tnay not wani siniilai" strategic benefits from the
alliance. In other terms, the definition offered here separates the issues of
what an international alliance is anti tiiight provide from how, or the degree
to which, one or tnore sponsors tnight appropriate speeilie potential beiic-
iils from an alliance. Thus, our focus is on alliatices as an organizational
mode.
An Institutional View of International Alliances
The receril tlnimatic increase iti the number antl lotigevity of international
alliances sugi^ests that thev may be emereint; as, 'ordeiiv, slahle, sociallvEmbedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 619
integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized or narrowly techni-
cal activities" (Selznick 1992: 232). The quote, of course, is a definition
for institutionalization, Denekamp et al. (1997) provide preliminary evi-
dence that certain forms of international alliances which are believed to be
institutionalized are indeed shown to be more stable and appear to influ-
ence their immediate environment.
A popular theme in the institutional literature which appears relevant to the
study of international alliances is the study of why organizational practices
and structures emerge, become generally copied and. over time, become
established as institutionalized or taken-for-granted activities (e.g. Baum
and Oliver 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Haveman 1993; Holm 1995;
Leblebici et al, 1991; Oliver 1992). Here, the notion of the embeddedness
of the entity in its context, which is based on imitation and confoimity, is
seen as the key to understanding institutionalization (see a review by Baum
and Dutton 1996). Institutional processes are typically discussed at the
organizational field level within a particular soeiocconomic setting
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989), By definition, however, many inter-
national alliances cut across existing organizational fields and socio-
economic settings.
Most importantly, the dominant rule of relationship linking an entity to its
setting is an interesting mix of detemiinistn and choice. Some institutional
theorists stress that the conformity of the entity to its setting should be from
the individual to the firm, the firm to its immediate environment or firms
to their socioeconomic settings (see Baum and Dutton 1996). Some of the
arguments here are often consistent with those found in contingency the-
ory (e,g, Donaldson 1985) or population ecology (Freeman and Hannan
1989). For instance, firms may conform in order to boost their legitimacy
because legitimacy may increase their chances of survival. Of course, the
trigger for change in most contingency analyses is a firm's performance
that threatens its survival (e,g. Bluedorn 1993), while institutional theorists
arc more likely to stress responses to broader factors potentially influenc-
ing a whole series of finns (see Powell 1996).
A counter theme in many institutional analyses stresses choice, particularly
when the forces facing the entity are either ambiguous or conflicting (see
Miller 1996; Powell 1996). Consistent with Simon's model of bounded
rationality, these choices do not occur in either a vacuum of information
or with complete rationality. Thus, individuals may imitate to conform to
broad institutional forces and still negotiate their social construction of real-
ity within the framework of their existing knowledge. Thus, finns are not
expected to be identical to one another, even though many may share many
similar characteristics.
Imitation and Embeddedness
Whitley (1994). among others, has noted that when organizations attempt
to expand beyond their national boundaries they implicitly take with them
their nation's history of socioeconomic choices. On the international scene.620 Richard N, Osborn et al
they become representatives of iheir home luitktn. When firms loini an
inlernationai aliiatice. of eoursc, each may represent its own liosi socio-
econotnic system, Wilhcut a coninionly sliareii soeioeeononiic hi,story. one
firm nia\ attempt to impose its system on the olher. Such was apparently
the ease for many alliances involving large nniltiriaticnais IVCMII devel(*pcii
countries and smaller lii'tiis from less developed nations (see Franko 1971 i.
Iknvever, recent reports suggest thai alliances atiiong Ci>mparable (irnis
Irotii economically developed nations are increasiniily p<ipular (.see
Hagedoorn i993a). Here, sponsors may be generally blocked froin ineiviy
replieatitiy the nationally preferred cooperative structures they may have
used in their home country. To form an international alliance, sponsors
IVoni developetl nations often need to overcome these hisjcric et^otcxlual
differences.
All sponsors do, however, share one larger institutional setting, that heitiL;
the itidustry of the alliance itself. To the degree institutionali/ation proeesses
hold, sponsors may copy popular formation iealures for new alliances from
within the alliances' industry, as the industry represents the e(>ninion insti-
tutional environment (cf, DiMaggio and Powell 1983), This generai empha-
sis on the industrial setling a.s a foeus lor iniitaiion is consistent with numentus
institutional studies (e.g, Leblebici et al, 1991: Baum and Oliver 1991), ro
the degree that institutionali/atlon holds, the infernal eharacteri,stics of the
alliance should be embedded in this larger industrial mass.
The Basis for Imitation
Simple imitation involves copying the historically most popular practices,
as these may relieet eollective learning. Here, it is proposed that new inter-
national alliance formation characteristics stem from "infoniied imitation',
which is merely the process (if copying key visible features of the appar-
ently viable experiments of others llial are involvctl in exchanging andA^r
developing highly similar products and services. The term 'infornied
imitation" is used to dilTetentiate the proposed treattnent of iiiiitailon from
the more common coercive, niimetie antl normative categories suggested
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Informed Imitation is narrower in seopc
than DiMaggio and Poweil's 11983) more generalized niinictie nieehanism
beeatise the sponsors lack a cotnnion cultural base for joint understanding.
Further, the sponsors" ktiowledge of international alliance praetices is iikeK
to be more limited than their knowletlgc ol" domestic managerial jiractiees.
Thus, imitation tnay be restricted to visible aliianee charaelerislics.
When lirsi announced, international alliances are typically ascribed in ilie
popular press with important speeitic charaeteristies and expected rclatioiiai
Duteomes (see Duysters and FilageiliMim l'-)93; Osborn and Baughn !'-)'•)()).
I'oi" iiistaiiee. poptilai press aiinoiincenienis rotUiiiely describe the area of
alliance activity, the intended llous of" prodticls aiul kiuiwletige ihrough tlie
Lillianee. its geiictal adniiiiistrati\'e lortii and ils ex|X'eiei_l iitMc<nnes, Tliese
visible characteristics o\' alliances have also been sttidiet! eMensl\ci\' in ilu'
literaaiie (see Oshorn and Ihcjiedoorn i*)M7 lor a re\'ie\v)-Embedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 621
Other finns hoping for similar outcomes arc expected to imitate speeitic
visible alliance characteristics even though they may subsequently modify
ihese during operations. Unlike new organizations, sponsors of international
alliances are not assumed to desire additional legitimacy by merely copy-
ing fonns popular within a given area (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), Instead,
sponsors are expected to imitate apparently viable alliances under the pre-
sumption that they would prefer successful relations. However, to isolate
the viability of the visible characteristics it is necessary to go beyond tra-
ditional institutional theory.
Incorporation of Contingency and Ecoiogical Views
Both structural contingency perspectives (see Bluedom 1993 and Donaldson
1996 for reviews) and population ecology views (see Baum 1996 for a
review) suggest that there may be a limited number of viable patterns or
combinations of environmental conditions and organizational forms at any
one time. There is considerable disagreement among institutional, contin-
gency and ecological scholars over which extemal variables should be con-
sidered, the number of potentially viable pattems and the importance of
choice. Yet, all suggest that the fit or combination among environmental
and organizational characteristics is important for viability.
Many institutional analyses attempt to separate institutional, economic and
technological factors into separate forces (see Powell 1996 for a discus-
sion). Powell (1996), among others, has suggested that these factors tnay
be co-mingled rather than being inconsistent or orthogonal. Some of the
institutional literature explicitly incorporates econotnic and technical ralio-
nalily into the more general analyses of mimetic isomorphism. For instance,
Haveman (1993) suggests that mimetic isomorphism ean result from effi-
cient responses to uncertainty. Further, Haveman's (1993) study of market
entry is also consistent with Auster's (1992) analyses of new U,S,/Japanese
alliance fomiations across several industries with different degrees of devel-
opment. Both reiterate a theme often heard in population ecology that orga-
nizations subjected to the same environmental conditions acquire a similar
form (Freeman and Hannan 1989; Hawley 1968).
If the survival of the alliance is a necessary condition for its viability as
an entity, systems contingency theory (e.g, Donaldson 1985) and popula-
tion ecology studies (e.g. Freeman and Hannan 1989) suggest that there
should be an interactive association among the environment and the fomi
of the alliance. Note here that the form of embeddedness is a veiy specific
'if-then' statement. This has generally been interpreted in empirical stud-
ies as a statistical interaction over and above simple additive effects (see
Bluedom 1993).
So far, we have suggested that the alliance's industry is a common envi-
ronment for the sponsors and a focal point for itnitation. It seems reason-
able to propose that international alliances may be embedded in their
industrial settings. As discussed in more detail below, the. administrative
form of the alliance and the product/knowledge flows through tlie alliance622 Richard N, Osborn et al-
are two theoreticaiiy important and visible alliance-formation charaeteris-
ties. If the sponsors utilize informed imitation and the rule of relationship
among the environment, and internal characteristics is interactive, the fol-
lowing may be stated:
///,• llic industrx of the interitauonal uUiancc. the alliattcc's adiunitstrativc form
and the prixltictikiiowlcdgc flaws throtigh the titliance will he entheddcd into one
ancithcr such that statisticallx the industrial .Kctting and the <illi(incc chitractcri:s-
tics will be tttteracdvcly associated.
International Alliances as Action Takers
So far, we have suggested that industrial practices are a locus lor imita-
tion. The formation pattem is expected to be consistent with the viability
of the alliance as a framework tor the sponsors' collective interests, 1'his
vieu' emphasizes both the socially constructed aspects of international
alliances and recognizes that the alliance's viability serves as a restraint on
unbridled executive choice.
An institutional view also suggests that international alliances are not just
a framework for the sponsors" actions (adaptation and cooperation) but also
action takers (cf. Holm 1995), That is, the alliance may have a function
that is separable from those of any one sponsor, even if this function can
be related to the sponsor's interests (cf. Holm 1995). Further, new inter-
national alliances are, by definition, experiments in institution building.
They are unique, relational institutions. As relational entities, the intetnal
eonfiguration of the alliance may refleei its needs as an action taker as well
as the interests of the sponsors.
The Administrative Forms of International Alliances
If the intemationa! alliance is an action-taking entity that Is expected to be
viable, it is again useful to consider the very large body of research on con-
tingency theory. Studies dating back to the work o{ Burns and Stalker
(1961) and Thompson (1967) generally suggest the potential importance of
a specific fit between or among (a) an entity's environment, (b) its admin-
istrative structure, and/or (c) ils internal throughput (technology). If ii is to
be successful (,see Bluedom 1993, Donaldson 1996), Many studies of
allianees describe the administrative form on a sitigular continuum ranging
from conlracts to partial equity forms (Gulati 1995), Institutional and con-
tingency perspectives suggest that distinct types of administrative form may
be salient. Consistent with Holm (1995), there may be distinetly different
administrative logics underlying different administrative forms. Sel/.nick,
for instance, suggests an 'intrinsic conflict between the premises of con-
tract and those of association (1996: 270)",
One eentral contrast is the contractual emphasis on the value of ownership
versus an association emphasis on the attentiveness to long-term interests
and the structure of authority. Contracts for stipply involve discrete nego-
tiatitni over speeilie pi'ovisions (duration, price, quatitity, quality, and theEmbedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 623
like) and expected adjustments to recognized, foreseeable contingencies. In
contrast, so-called technical agreements to share, exchange and/or develop
knowledge or technology rest on an association logic (cf\ Hagedoorn 1993a),
Teehnieal agreements represent an understanding of a cooperative relation-
ship between parties for their long-term interests. Consistent with Holm
(1995), this is a logic of association more than a specific protnisc to deliver,
for consideration, according to a contract. Thus, while individually based
values such as compliance, trust and forbearance may underlie contracts (cf,
Parkhe 1993), the associative framework for action is supported by the
expectation of reciprocity in order to sustain the relational entity.
The contract and association logics also appear quite different from an
administrative logic, such as found in joint ventures. In a joint venture, the
sponsors have specified an administrative mechanism to conduct operations
within a separate hierarchy (Williamson 1991), Here, the logie of admin-
istration rather than contract would seem to dictate. Thus, it is little won-
der that analyses of joint ventures often emphasize the more standard
administrative issues of control (Gcringcr and Hebert 1989), the selection
and actions of the general manager of the joint venture (e,g, Geringer 1991)
as well as the division of ownership shares (e.g. Killing 1982).
Product/Knowledge Flows and Interdependence
Part of Thompson's (1967), now classic, contingency analyses stressed the
importance of different forms of interdependence in the flow of work among
the parties to an administrative entity. For successful operations, sequen-
tial and pooled interdependence called for less elaborate, expensive and
responsive fonns of integration than reciprocal interdependence. It called
for mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment called for more flexible, respon-
sive and idiosyncratic forms of integration.
Descriptions of the product/knowledge flows in most alliance studies have
implicitly emphasized sequential interdependence. Whether based on the
early trade theories of cotnparative advantage (see Deardorff 1979 for a
review), the eclectic theory (Dunning 1979), the intemalization approach
(Rugman and Verbeke 1992), or the literature on entry mode choice (e.g.
Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Hennart 1988; Hill et al, 1990), interna-
tional alliances have been seen as mechanisms for the unidirectional out-
ward expansion of products and knowledge or as (e.g. Smith and Ziethaml
1993) exploiting some comparative national or firm advantage (e.g, Hennart
1988).
However, more recent work suggests that alliances are expected to be pop-
ular in technologically intensive industries because they are flexible mech-
anisms that firms can use simultaneously and cooperatively to develop new
products and processes and jointly build reciprocal value-added networks
(e.g, Auster 1992; Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hagedoom 1993a). The
work flow patterns in these alliances appear to emphasize mutual adjust-
ment through reciprocal exchanges of products and knowledge. Here, the
implicit assumption is that both sponsors have important and neeessary624 Richard H. Osborn et al
eompetencies to contribute to a synergistie effort. Thus, the interdepeti
dence should be I'eciprocaL iiol unidirectional.
Hven though tiiuch i>f the current alliance literature seems lo use produci/
knowledge flows to charaeteri/c the nature of alliance's reciprocal inter-
dependence, there appears io be a split opinion on how to deal wiih iliffei-
ent types of product/knowledge fli)vvs. On the one hand, ihere are those who
emphasi/c transactkni-cosi mitiluii/ation (e.g. Williamson 1991), ikrc. the
joint-venture fomi. with ils admuiistrative logic and emphasis oii control,
would be preferred over less hierarehieal administrative forms for copini;
with the tincertainty sieniniitig from reciprocal fiows and lor monitoring
CDinpliance with the iniliai agreement (e.g. Burgers et lil, 1993: llennart
1988). On the other hand. Hagedoorn uiu! his colleagues (Duysters aiul
1 lagedofirn 1993; Hagedoom 1993b) suggest that the associative logic Ibniul
In the agreement form might be moi'e appropriate for siiniulatiiig exchange
and development. Osborn antl his eollcagues (see Osborn antl Baughn 1993:
Baughn el al, 1997) have a similar argument. They suggest that mutual ct)n-
trol in an agreement Ibrin vvlili reelproeal iiitertlependence may he aceotn--
phshetl by the |>t)tential threat of one parly to withhold the knowlcd-ie neetled
to proceetl \o the next stage of eoiniiierciali/ation.
International Alliance Sub-populations as Specific Patterns of
Embeddedness
So far. the Linalysis has attcinplcd to rect)giii/e liie duality and eoinpiexhy
of International alliances (soe Osborn and llaged(H>rn l'-)')7), The> are eo-
operalions (frameworks for action) between sell-interesled corporalions.
where these sjionsors are loeated in separate nations iuui cidlures.
Executives are expected to imitate other apparently viable alliance'^ in the
allianec's industry. Yet, we also suggested thai to form an alliance the exec-
utives ncc(\ \o ;igree to a ii)glc i>f assticialion, contract or admiiiistratit)!i
antl to establish a pattern of produet/kiitnvletlge exchanges. Sponsors are
expeetet! to socially construe! an alliunce consistent with their iiv\ n inter-
ests and bargaining power as well as the alliance's functit>n. We explicit!)
noted some of the inconsistent recommendations (rom the cuirent litera-
ture ctincerning the ehoiee ot administrative forms and produet/knowlediie
liows,
Mtdding other factors constant (such as natit>na!!ty. corporate si/e antl tiil-
ferciiecs In bargaining pt)\vei). we now etmtenti that some specific enihetl-
(tetl et)ivibinali(nis are nn»re likely thai! others. That is. cuiisisient with
industry-speeilic conditions and opportunities for ect)noniic and/or teeh-
nieal atiaptatit>ii, stmie e(Hiibinatit)ns of atlministrative form antl product/
kntivvledge flow might be favtuireti over others. While theix' arc potcntiallv
iiiiuiy ctnnbinalions, tvvt) arc suggested In the nitnv iratiitiona! alhanee
analyses. One is based on transaction cost ect»noniics. I'he sceontl relics
niore on Ihe teehnt>lt)i!v literature.Embeddeci Patterns of International Alliance Formation 625
Dominance
Fven in technically stable industries, there may still be considerable uncer-
tainty in forming an alliance aeross national boundaries. Sponsors should
be prepared, for instance, to react to a host of shifting national, lirm-spe-
cific, and transaction-specific advantages as they struggle in a eontiiuiing
battle for global competitive donnnanee (cf. Dunning 1993). The shifting
setting may provide ample opportunities for opportunism (Williamson
1991, 1996), Thus, tinns may seek the protection of a hierarehieal admin-
istrative form (e.g, joint venture). The product/ knowledge Hows arc likely
to stem from national or lirm comparative advantages and favour unidi-
rectional rather than reciprocal exchanges. In Thompson's (1967) terms,
sponsors will opt for pooled and sequential interdepentlcnce. The pattern
of mtire stable industrial condititMis with unidirectional proUtiet/knowletlge
flows through equity alliance forms to minimize opptirtunism may be called
a dominance pattem. The pattern relleets the untlerlying rationale presentetl
by many transaction cost and inlernalization theorists (e.g. Burgers et al,
1993; Dunning 1993; Gulati 1995; Williamson 1996). In sum:
H2: In more stitblc. mature industries, inlcrinitionitt (tlliances with unidirectional
product!knowledge flows through hierarchical adtninislrutivc forms (joittl ventures
and partial equity purvlutscs) will he proportioiiaietv more tunncrotis than atty
other comhination of fortu and flow directioti.
Hybridization
Several scholars suggest that intemational alliances are an effective mech-
anism for coping with specilic technological ctindititins, Differenl authors
stress somewhat different industrial challenges, sueh as change and com-
plexity (cf. Auster 1992; Osbtirn and Baughn 1990; Hagedoorn 1993a),
technolt)gical discontinuities (Anderson and Tushman 1990). comniereial
complementarities and commercial inseparabilities (Teece 19S6). In many
oi' these analyses, the fonnation characteristics t)f intemational alliances are
expected to match the technolt)gical requirements.
The favoured administrative form in response to diseontiuuitics. uncer-
tainty, commercial complementarity, ctmimercial inseparabilities and/or
technoltjgical change may nt)t be simple supply contracts or joint ventures.
but agreements (also known as incomplete or relational contracts, see Acs
and Gcrlowski's 1996 review). With rapid technological development,
potentially eoupled with teehnological discontinuities, sponsors may be
unwilling and/or unable to fix the character of the contributions in suffi-
cient detail either to consummate a simple supply contract or specify a joint
venture.
For example, new commercial inseparabilities often emerge across once
separate technical regimes (e.g. hardware and software, design and service
in computers or chemistry and biology in biotechnology), Inter-
organizational alliances may emerge to link once separate areas as a form
of mutualism (ef, Barnett 1990), Thus, Instead of unidirectional ilows of626 Richard N, Osborn et al.
products or knowlctlgc through the alliance, sponsors may opt lor recipro-
cal produet/knowiedge exchanges to develop new coinbinatitms of prtv
ductit)n processes, products and services,
A technological view discards the presumption that firms should select an
administrative ft)nn that minimizes transaction costs. Instead, tinns are
required tt) select product/knowledge flows and combinatiitus of adminis-
trative forms that increase the chances of sueeessful commercialization and/
or adjustment. The issue is more: How can it be done?; rather than: How
efiieientK can il be accotnplished? In hybridization, it is ihe role of the
alliance as an action taker that is emphasi/ctl. Thus:
II.'': Within technology-intensive tndustries. chuntcicrized by comnicrciai inscpa-
tability, ttUidiiccs with reciprocal proiluctiknowledgc jiows. cottplcil with ai;rcc-
nicnts as the iidniinistralivc fonn. will be proporiiomtlcly more ntuncnms ihaii un\
other comhination of form utui ficnc direction.
Btith ihmiinance and hybridization appear to be viable eonibinations. The)'
are combinations of industry, administrative form and produet/knovvledge
Ilows subject to informed imitation. If such is the ease, at least two quite
different 'institutionali/ed sub-pt)pulatioiis' oi alliance,^ may be found.
While there is a choice of which combination t)f industry, administrative
form and product/knowledge flow is selected, some choices are nn»re
poptilar and potentially more elTcctive than others.
Sample Selection and Measures
All the empirical literature reviewed relied upon a single sample,
were restricted tt) joint ventures or explicitly excluded stinie lypes oi'
alliances (e.g. Geringer 1991), oihers concentrated only t)n wiihin-industry
alliances by very large corporations (e.g. Gulati 1995), while many were
restricted to one specilic industry (eg. Burgers et al. 1993: Powell et al-
1996) ov U) two ctiuntries (e.g. Auster 1992; Osbt^n and Baughn 1990).
Here, the hypotheses were tested in two distinct large data sets covering a
wide variety of natittns, industries, alliance types and sptinsor sizes.
Samples
The Iirst sample is a tictailctl ct)lleeti(>n of 625 alliances formed by U.S.
and Japanese firms during 1988 and 1989 described by the Japanese
F.xlernal Trade Organization (see JFTRO). The second sample eoneerns
762 alliance fonnations between forms headquartered in the United States,
Japan and Western Furope between 1970 1989, drawn from the
Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI) information
system (see Duysters and Hagedoom 1993).
While 762 new alliances in the CATI data for Japan, L^nited States and
Westem Ftirope from 1970 to 1989 appears smull compared to ihc (^25
alliances found in the JFTRO sample for 1988-1989. it is imptirtant toEmbedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 627
recognize that the JETRO data contain information on alliances with rela-
tively stnall Japanese firms which tnay have been missed by the announce-
ments methodology. Furthermore, the JETRO database contains a greater
number of long-temi supply agreements, which may be under-rep resented
in the CATI database due to its sole reliance upon public announcements.
The JETRO data allows for a test of the hypotheses across industries with
widely varied firm sizes for alliances fomied between finns in two nations
during one time period. In comparison, the CAT! data allows for a test of
the hypotheses aeross the ,same industries over a longer time period with
a wider variety of nation states being represented.
The United States, Japan, and Westem European nations together represent
a diverse collection of technically and economically advanced countries
where (a) there is extensive trade, (b) there has been a pronounced shift in
the intemational division of labour since the end of World War II. and (c)
there has been intense cotnpetition in the industries selected for study.
Variables
The testing of Hypotheses 1 to 3 required consistency in measuring the
variables across the two unique satnples. Measures of the industry of the
alliance, the administrative form of the alliance, and the intended product/
knowledge flow through the alliance are described below.
Industry
JETRO classifies new alliances (not their sponsors) into a standardized tech-
nical area code. The codes selected were (i) autos (automobiles and auto
parts), (2) computers, (3) information and communication systems, and (4)
semiconductors (both chips and equipment). Formations from the CATI
data base were also recorded for these same industrial categories. Prior
studies suggest that these industries contain the vast majority of interna-
tional alliances formed atnong firms headquartered in developed nations
(see Hagedoom 1993a),
Autos and auto parts represent a mature area (see Auster 1992) of intense
intemational competition. Between U.S. and Japanese fmns, some consider
the Japanese to have had a competitive advantage during the 1988-1989
study period (e.g. Burgers et al. 1993). The Furopean auto industry is, and
was during the study period of the CATI data, a very cotnplex mix of
national champions (e.g. France, Germany, Italy) and foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries by such multinationals as GM and Ft)rd,
Prior analyses of the remaining industries suggest that they were relatively
early in the technological development cycle during the two study periods.
Commercial inseparabilities have been considered very important in the
rapidly growing computer and infomiation/communication systems indus-
tries (see Auster 1992; Pisano and Teece 1989; Yoffie 1994). Semicon-
ductors were also included because they appeared to be an unstable, high
growth area with moderate commercial inseparabilities (sec Borrus 1988
and Yoffie 1994).628 Richard N Osborn et al
Administrative Forms
Both data sets incltide all types ofallianee forms. They v\cre cotled as sup-
ply agreements (long-term contraels for the sale of ctmiponents. produets
or ser\ ices from one sp()ns(ir to another or reeiprt)eal exchanges thereof),
technical agreements isingle or joint R&D agreements, lieensmg or
crtiss/lieensing agreemenls, murkeling or proiUietion agreements Lis well as
eombinations oi ihese), jt'int ventures, (the croati(M! tif a separate k\i;al
entity) and partial eqtiity purchases,
Product/Knowledge Flows
Both the .lETRO and the (\AT1 tiata seis describe ihe nature of the Ilows
of prtxlucts and know ledge exehangctl via the aliianee. In order to capture
the tlegi'ee of reciprocal iiiteidependenee, these tkiws were eotleti as either
unklireetitinal tir reciprocal, based on the descriptions of the indivklual
alhanees, P<ir example, in simple customer-supplier agreements there \s a
iiiikiircetit)nai How of jirotiuets from t)ne partner to another, SimiiarK. in
licen,sinu, and cross-liecnsing agreements iheie are ilistinelive patterns of
single or intitiial teehnology iransler which wtuiltl have been characleri/ed.
respectively, as niii(lirecllt)nal antl I'eciproeal.
Methodology and Findings
l-'or btith samples, there were siifiicient numbers of allianees v\iih ai! pos-
sible ctimbinatitms to test the interactive hypotheses lor all Industries, with
one exception, fhere were but 13 II,S./Japanese alliances in commuiiiea-
tloiis. Sinee analyses tiropping c<immunicatit)ns still shtnved a signilicant
triple-order interaction, the tables report eomparahle tIata for all four indns
tries for hoih samples.
Complete data on alliance eharacteristies were nvaikiblo for ()25 l\S,
,lapii!iese allianees. Of the 625 U.S,/.lapanese allianees InckHJed in the
JETRO sample. 177 were supply contracts, 264 w-ere technical agreements
and 184 v\'ere jtiint venttnx's and partial et|uity purchases. 431 i>f ihe
aiiianees in the Jf-tTRO sample had annt>tincL'd unidirectional product/
kru)wledge nt)ws while 194 liati annoLineed reciprt)cul Hows, There were
131 alliances in semiconductors in the JFl'RO sample while 24^ were in
coiiij)uters. 13 in eommunicati(*ns/inft)rmation systems antl 238 in aiittis/
at!H> parts.
The (.'.ATI tIata prt)vitietl 762 allianees invtilving Japan, Western Kurope
and/or ihe UniictI States. Here, there were 129 suppl>' etmtraets, 344 teeh-
nieal agreements and 289 joint ventures; 305 oi 762 allianees ;innotinced
uiiitlireetk>nal product/knt)w ledge lU)ws antl 457 anntnincetl icelpitjcal
tloU'S. Similarly, for the CATI tiala, thei*e were 229 in seinictindtietois, Ui9
in eomputers, 227 in etinimtinieations/informalion syslems and 137 in
auios/auto parts.
The interaetive hypotheses which predicted embetkiedness (Mil was tested
hierarchical loe linear analvsis. This nroeeilure is idoallN suited toEmbeddeci Patterns of International Alliance Formation 629
examining inleraclive associalions amotig categtirical variables (see Dillon
and Goldstein 1984 for a discussioti). These results arc contained in Tables
I and 2 tor the JETRO and CATI samples,, respeetively. The findings for
the interactive results were completely consistent with HI. There were
significant triple-order interactions for both samples. Specifically, industry,
product/knowledge flow direction and administrative form were inter-
actively related over and above the additive and second-order effects, as
suggested by the inslitutiona! embeddedness hypothesis (HI),
An inspection of the data (complete data available from the senior author)
indicated mixed evidence for the hybridizctf and dominance patterns pre-
dicted in Hypotheses 2 and 3 when viewed across both samples. Consider
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flows administered via technical agreements within techtioiogy-iiitensive
industries wiih polcnlial conimetcial in,separahilitics. In semiconductors and
cotnputei's, reciprocal technical agreements were, in fact, disproporiioiiateK
more popular than any other cotiihination for both samples, Specilicall>,
wiih an even di,stribution o( iorms and Ilows in semiconductors one vvoukl
expect 22 reciprocal technical agreements in the JETRO sample while Uie
actual number was 40 {j> < ,01); in the CA'fl sample the expected value for
semiconductors was 38 and the actual was 85 (/' < ,01), f-or computers, the
relevant data were 40 expected reeiprocal technical agreemeiits wiih 75
actual [p < ,01) in JHTRO and 28 expected wtth 46 actual (/> < ,05) in C'ATi,
There were too few allianees in eommunieations for the JETRO sample but
in (he CAYl data 25 reeiproea! teehnieal agreements were expecled while
OS weie Ibiind (/? < ,01).
Similarly, Hypothesis 2 predicted that unitlirectional flows administered via
equity arrangements shoukl be more ruimeroLts than any othei" (orni in stable
tuattire industries. This result was clearly supported foi* autos and auto part,s
in the JH'I'RO sample. Thirty-eight unidirectional joint ventures were
expecled. but 71 w^^rc foLMKl (p < .01), IKpoihesis 2 was not supported hy
the CAFI ,sainple as there was noi a signilicatitly ilisproportionate numbei' of
one-way joint venttires l23 were expecied and 32 were fountl with a/' > ,05-
Furthermore, the number of equity-based alliatiees with reeiprocal tlow s {5 I)
exceeded the number of joint ventures with unidireetional Ilows,
Discussion
For both samples. Hi, concerning enibeddedness, was supported with sig-
niheant triple-order interaction. The administrative forms of inienuUional
allianees. ihe Hows oi prodtiels/knowledge ihrough the allianees and their
area of ofieratioii (iiuluslry) wci'e embedded in one anoluer at fonnation.
These restilts were eonsistent with the proposed insiitutional approaeh Ihat
inelutletl eeologieal and eontitigeiie)' views, suggesting embeddedness as
higher order interactive relalionship. Within the context of the triple-order
interaction suggesting embeddetlness, these results were also generally con-
sistent with the iheoretieal e\peetation of at least one oi ihc two dislinet
insiiiutionalized sub-poptilations of alliances labelled hybridi/allon and
tlominanee.
Identifiable Sub-populations
Aliianee formation iti teehnoiogy-intensive industries eharaeteii/eil by dis-
conliniiities and eotnmereiai inseparabilities tiisproportionatcly favoured
]"eeiprocal produet/knowiedge tlows in tcehtiical agreetrients. This hybi'i-
dized pattern vv;is most clearly evident in the eomptiier antl semieonduetor
technical areas in fiotli ihe JIifRO and CAT! data sets. This pattern appears
i|uitc eonsisteni with the theoreiieal expoctallons of infortiied iniitalioti to
eope with teehnoioaieal eonditions. Here, international alHanee torniationEmbedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 631
was consistent with mutualism and an associative logic stressing recipro-
cal adjustment and development (cf. Auster 1992; Bamett 1990; Hagedoorn
1993b; Osbom and Baughn 1993). The alliance appears to be configured
as an action taker.
In autos and auto parts, the analyses of the JETRO formation data revealed
a preference for equity arrangements with unidirectional intended prod-
uct/knowledge flows from Japan to the United States. This dominance pat-
tem at formation appeared quite consistent with that expecled from an
economics perspective to reduce transaction costs (cf, Wilhamson 1991).
For instance, intemalization theory would suggest that if Japanese firms
were moving to capture nation-specific advantages in the United States to
complement tbeir firm-specific advantages (cf. Buckley and Casson 1988;
Dunning 1988) they would prefer to form unidirectional joint ventures over
simple contracts or loose agreements.
The CATI database failed lo show Ihe dominance pattern involving unidi-
rectional flows in autos/auto parts. Equity arrangements were predominant
overall (83 equity linkages versus 54 technicai and supply linkages), as
would be expecled from a iransaction cost logic (Burgers et al, 1993;
Williamson 1996). However, reeiprocal product/knowledge fiows outnum-
bered unidirectional ilows and the preferred combination was reciprocal
flows using joint ventures.
Across Europe, the United States and Japan over a twenty-year time span,
sitTiple unilateral intemalization did not appear lo operate (Buckley and
Cas,son 1988), Rather than a simple continuous replication of a once pre-
ferred combination of the joint venture with a unidirectional flow (see
Burgers et al. 1993), or a simple extension of one firm's competencies (cf.
Dunning 1993), sponsors made a variety of choices regarding product/
knowledge flow. Perhaps the traditional expected dominance pattern has
been dc-institutionalized by continued substantial changes in the global auto
industry (see Oliver 1992).
Limitations
Several specific external factors not measured in this study might account
for the variations around the dominance theme. In the developed nations
studied here, there is a history of very substantial direct (as with the
Japanese and many European nations) or indirect (as with the U.S.) gov-
ernment involvement in the automotive industry. Thus, in addition to
Whitley's (1994) notion of exporting ,some socioeconomic choices, we sus-
pect the attempt by globalizing fimis in a developed industry to merely
expand their (ominance is explicitly muted by govemmental influence or
the threat of governmental action.
It is also possible lliai parts of this industry are undergoing technological
change even though (a) auto design and assembly retnain within the major
manufacturers and (b) volume operations remain important due to heavy fixed
investments. For the more volume-sensitive iu^eas undergoing change, per-
haps the reciprocal joint venture is a compromise that balances inconsistent632 Richard N, Osborn et al.
demands for joitil eommereialization and eost eontrol, A reeiproeal joisit
venture may provide suflieietU niutualistn needed for technical develup-
tiicni and adjtistmeiit while providing the eontrol neeessary lo proteel heavy
lixed inveslnients as well as the bureaueralie siandardizatioti neeessary in
integrate new technologies into mature faeilities and operations.
The econt)n-iic view may still be accurate over time. The inability to elearl_\'
measure the viability and survival of Ihe various patterns is bi.)ih Li serious
limitation and a ehallenge for j'uture reseai'ch. It is possible, for instanee,
ihat ihe propiwed government inlerventioii in the auto hxUistrv did make a
difference in formation pailerns. but that the dominance paiterii with uni-
directional Mows will be more clearly seen among the longer surviving and
more sueeessful alHanees,
This study shows a clear trade-off between breadth ami depth, Althotigh
the (iata underiying this study are nuieh tnore comprehensive ihan prior
studies, this breadth prevented detailed measurement of a host oi variables,
Relaiion-specitic Scg, irusi: see Park and Dngson 1993), lirni-speeilic (e,g,
charaeteristies of the exeeutive leams and the straiegie intent of the spon-
sors: Harrigan 1985). industry-speeitic {e.g. R&l) intensity across a broader
range oi itidustries; Osbom and Baughti 1990) and nation speciiie Ic.u.. )zo\-
crnanee preferences by national govei'ninents: Franko 1971) variables were
not measured. Yet, conirols lor firm si/e and similarity in the analyses of
the JK'IKO data were not signiticant, nor did national differences intUienee
the signilieant linditigs in the C'ATl data. It is possible more speeilie
national differences (e.g. government policies, wage rales and imkistrial
eompeteiic}. as noted by Whitley 1994) or regional differences (luirope.
North Ameriea and Asia) may still be important in charting the sueeess or
failure of aMiunces (e.g, Mundell 1994),
Future Research
The ooiieept of informed imitation yielding ihe expectation of generali/eci
industry cmbeddedtiess as an interactive relationship among sesling and
aliianee eharaeteristies as well as specific institutionalized sub-poptilations
helps the analy,st lo link the different units of analysis. The eoneept oi
informed imilation involves Joint executive ehoiee by individuals wiihin
sponsoring lirms from two sepai'ate tiatioiis concerning eombinations ol
industry and alhanee eharacEensiies. Thus, il moves iraditional inslilutiona!
theory weli heyoiid its typieal Held and stK'ioeeonotnie boundaries. There
is tio expeetation thai executives share a cottmion eultutv, values, or his-
tory. They are not eolleclively captui-od by a common ,soeioeconomie set-
ting. Yet. iti spite oi all oi these differences, they ehoose to c(K)|K-rate in
similar ways vvheti faeed wiili similar iiulustrial eonditions.
In far too many institulional perspeciives eeotiomJe. teehnieal and institu-
tional (social) factors are arliticially separated from one aiioiher into dis-
iinct forces (see Powell 1996 for a discussion). In far too tnany eeotioniie
views, the emphasis on the details of the iransaelioti ignores importanl
"exogetious factors". If the goal is to explain and prediet raiher ihan sup-Etnbedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 633
port or reject a line of inquiry, this paper suggests that institutional, eco-
nomic, teehnological and contingency perspectives collectively provide
valuable insights into aliianee fonnation.
Yet, to utilize these insights calls on the researcher lo violate some appar-
ently sacred traditions — traditions that may not be central lo the causal
tnechanistns that are the foeus of Ihe underlying theory (see Dubin 1969).
This work is replele with such "sins', Insiitutional theory is uiili/.ed for
international alliance formation where there is no cotntnon socioeconomic
or cultural selling — it is being created. Yet, the notion of imitation that
is central to this view was supported (see Selznick 1996). A typical popu-
lation view emphasizes evolution through the differentia! birth and death
rates of organizalional forms (see Astley 1985) under the presutnplion of
substantial bureaucratic intransigence (see Freeman and Hannan 1989), Yet,
via informed itiiitatioti, the paper does show that entities subject to the same
environment are similar (see Freeman and Hannan 1989). While contin-
gency theory suggests thai entities without an appropriate fit will die (see
Donaldson 1996), this study suggests thai alliances with an apparent lit
would more likely be viable for imitation.
Many analyses follow the tradition established by Harrigan (19S5) sug-
gesting that alliances are ihc children of Ihcir spon,soring parents. Our work
suggests that international alliances can be action takers and pursue a vari-
ety of goats. While they are created by sponsors and sponsor interest is
obviously important, Ihey tnay not be the captive of a single sp(jnsor (see
Harrigan 1985), The traditional conlinuum of administrative fonns so com-
mon in transaction eost analyses (e.g. Gulati 1995) was abandoned in favour
of examining discrete types (see Williamson 1996). Yet, the concept that
finns are interested in reducing the threats from opportunism and reducing
transaction costs was heavily utilized. Rather than foeus on a single spe-
cilic technological feature (see Anderson and Tushman 1990). broader
industrial categories were emphasized hei'e as a focal point for imitation.
Yet, the characterizations of the industries rested heavily upon prior tech-
nology studies (see Hagedoom )993b).
Beyond modifyitig existing views and linking them, future studies should
also identify the dynamics of informed iiiiitalion over time. At what point
does a new institutionalized sub-population emerge? Do all institutional-
ized sub-populations autotnatically involve the same measured variables
identified in this study? For instance, perhaps the next institutionalized sub-
population will involve networks of International alliances (see Osbom and
Hagedoorn 1997). How quickly do new, apparently viable, combinations
spread across ihe globe? Do the costs and benefits of various fonns them-
selves shift over litne? And, of course, when and how is an institutional-
ized pattern deinstimtionalized (Oliver 1992)?
If executives are boundedly rational, what are these bounds when they are
etigaged in intemational alliance fonnation? How do Ihey change over time
(e.g. Gulati 1995)? Which organizational eharaeteri,stics appear to tighten
or iooseti these bounds? This work suggests ihat a strategic choice for exec-
utives involves selection of an institutionalized pattein. However, it is634 Richard N, Osborn et al.
equally obvious that many did not ehoose hybridi/,alion or either variation
of dominance. Were they less informed than those who seleeted an insti-
tutionalized pattern, or were they eolleeiively attempting to ereate a viable
alliance that would work for them to pursue specifie aims be>'otui simple
iransaction eost reduction or eommereializalion? Clearh much more
theoretical and empirical work is also needed lo estitnate the boundaries
on informed imitation and embeddedness. as well as the lypes of sueeess
yielded by speeifie embedded palterns (see Dubin 1969). For insiaiiee, the
subsequent viability and relative success ol different embedded eombina-
tions needs lo be empirieally examined, nol automatically assumed.
Conclusions
In line with other papers in this volume, researchers are beginning to see
the issue of inter-firm coopei-ation in a inueh more complex tiiaiiner. No
singular iheoretieal perspective appears suftieienlly robust to fully explain
and predict iniernaiional alliance Ibnnaiion pailerns. Here, ihe analysis
centred on the wlioie industry as the focal point for informed imitalion to
isolate both generalized embeddedness and specilic pattems.
Any researeh study focuses on certain elements, ignoring others. The vast
bulk of the literature on intemational alliances focuses almost exelusivc!)
on these entities as frameworks for ihe actions of iheir sponsors. This study
also recognizes the potential for action lakiiig by alliances. With the incor-
poration oi institutional theory, this paper also recognizes the soeially eon-
strucied aspects of international allianees as experiments in cooperation. It
suggests thai the administrative form of the alliance and its product knowl-
edge fiows are einbedded in its industrial setting. This work views some
types of aiiiances as emerging institutionalized sub-populations.
By balancing deienninism and ehoiee In ihe analysis of international
alliance formation and linking an institutional view to more classic per-
spectives from population eeology and systems eontingeney theory, ihis
paper emphasized informed imitation as an underlying causal meehanism,
inlortTied Imilaiion based on the apparently viable alliances of others sug-
gested a very specitie form of industry embeddedness. The successfiillv
tesled inteipretation of embeddedness was an interaetion among setting and
aliianee charaeleristics. The expeetation that industry, administrative tbrtn
antl pi-oducl/knowledge flows would be interactively related at formation
was eonfinned in two very large and quile dirierent samples,
A more detailed expectation for speeifie pailerns of embeddedness ineor-
poraled work on transaction cosis and technologieal development to isolate
two polentially important sub-populations of international allianees. The
hybridized pattem (technically intense Industry coupled with reeiproeal
product/knowledge Mows administered in technical agreements) was coti-
firnied in both samples, antl a|ipears to be one institutionalized sub-populatioii
of allianees. Future researeh may identify additional sub-populations con-
sistent with ev{>lving intlustrv dvnamies.Embedded Patterns of International Alliance Formation 635
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